
CONTESTED

TERRAIN

In Defense of the New Left

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BOOK REVIEWED:

Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the
New Left: 1962–1968. The Great Refusal.*
New York: Praeger, 1982.

In 1960 Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell announced the end of ideology in America. Their claim that American politics had outgrown ideology obscured commitments to the static, anticommunist ideology of the cold war. The putative end of ideology failed to recognize the social groups and parts of the self excluded from a society in which, according to Lipset, “the fundamental political problems . . . have been solved.” It discredited larger purposes around which alternative commitments might be organized. These former Old Leftists who repudiated ideology claimed to be embracing the pragmatic, problem-solving character of American politics. Their end of ideology in fact justified the instrumental thinking by which a new, bureaucratic middle class served the dominant structures of power in American life.

Lipset and Bell were looking back, in 1960, on the apparent exhaustion of American radicalism. That same year black students in Greensboro, North Carolina, demanding service at segregated lunch counters, also called for an end to ideology. They repudiated abstract systems of thought in favor not of calculating reason but of personal witness. These Southern black students initiated a new radicalism; they returned to the roots of American pragmatism, and turned the attack on ideology against those who had proclaimed its demise.

Liberal intellectuals, celebrating technical rationality in the name of pragmatism, were obscuring the origins of the intellectual tradition they wanted to appropriate. Early pragmatists had rebelled against scientific positivism as well as other closed systems of thought, in the name of what William James called “the personal point of view.” James, John Dewey, and Jane Addams opposed ideology

in order to create meaningful, personal connections to social life. Their pragmatism empowered middle-class children isolated from and overwhelmed by alien social forces. Jane Addams, in her famous essay, urged "The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements." Actions that addressed the objective suffering of the lower classes, she argued, were necessary to heal the subjective suffering of the children of the middle class. Urban poor and middle-class young could make common cause, as Addams saw it, since industrial capitalism had historically dispossessed them both.

But because progressive pragmatists desired personal connections to life, they sought integration into the centers of American power. Afraid that a genuinely personal point of view would leave them isolated and alone, they sacrificed personal politics to win power and approval. On one reading, political pragmatists were unwilling to choose sides in the basic conflicts of American class (and racial) society. On another reading, they were unwilling to face the lack of conflict in American mass society. Progressives refused to stand, oppositionally, with (or without) the lower classes. Their paternalist reforms incorporated deprived social groups (more, or less, benevolently), undercutting sources of political opposition. The pragmatists' fear of conflict and isolation turned them from criticism to instrumentalism. Replacing the recovery of the personal by the fascination with technique, they ended by serving the state.

Lipset and Bell in 1960 stood at the endpoint of the transformation of American pragmatism. But an effort had been made before that accommodation to analyze and reverse pragmatism's self-destruction. Randolph Bourne, in several essays written during World War I, attacked the support of young pragmatists for war and the state. Bourne sought to recover the original spirit of William James by connecting it to those social groups partially outside the homogenizing tendencies of American life—workers, immigrants, and the bohemian young. Bourne proposed an oppositional politics sustained by countercultures. But he died in 1918 of influenza, at the age of thirty-two. The red scare and failed upheavals of 1919 crushed the hopes he had left behind.

The memory of Randolph Bourne disappeared for forty years, buried first by the Americanism of the 1920s, then by the class politics and welfare-state reforms of the 1930s, and then by the liberal nationalism of the 1940s and 1950s. During the 1960s, however, three different paperback selections of Bourne's writings appeared in print. For a mass movement of the children of the middle class, turning against the accommodationist pragmatism of its elders, was enacting the recovery of the personal point of view of which Bourne had been the prophet.

By the 1980s Bourne was once again absent from *Paperback Books in Print*. His disappearance recorded the fact that the attack on ideology, once a weapon that the New Left had turned against its elders, had ultimately done the movement in. By discrediting ideology, ex-Marxists had left themselves vulnerable, in the short run, to a personally based, radical politics. In the long run, however, old former

leftists knew what they were doing. Disabled from developing a theoretical perspective, and therefore to connect personal experience, political tactics, and social analysis, the New Left fell apart. But even as the movement turned apocalyptic, rigidified, despaired, and died, it helped end the war in Vietnam; returned the struggle for racial equality to the political agenda; left behind a variety of community, public interest, and environmental groups; discredited repressive idealizations of the American family; and generated, in however self-contradictory a way, a new, feminist movement. The New Left offered the most significant revitalization of American political life since the 1930s. Wini Breines's purpose, in her thoughtful and honest book, is to learn from it once again.

The sins charged against the New Left by its detractors point to the movement's roots in American pragmatism, for these sins all derived from the New Left's confusion of the personal with the political. New Left targets and methods derived, it was said, from personal needs rather than political judgments. The movement engaged in a personal imperialism, according to its critics, gratifying itself at the expense of parents on the one hand, working class and minority social groups on the other. Because its projective politics was blind to historical and social realities, so the argument goes, the New Left was doomed to failure. Politically frustrated New Leftists abandoned society for the cultivation of the self; the New Left thus gets blamed for both the political aggression of the 1960s and the narcissistic withdrawal of the 1970s.

The New Left not only failed to respect the autonomy of other groups, according to its critics, but also refused to concern itself with tactics. New Left politics was said to be expressive rather than instrumental. Insisting on personal purity at the expense of rational strategy, the New Left sacrificed politics to morality. The movement refused to think strategically, its enemies charged, because its ostensible targets were not its real objects. New Leftists did not really care about free speech, integration, or peace. They exploited concrete grievances to express vague, personal discontents. The movement's strategic failure thus mirrored its projective aims.

Wini Breines turns these familiar criticisms of the New Left upside down. The movement she describes consciously repudiated strategy, organization, and technique. Seeking to embody the future for which it fought in the present of the movement, it replaced strategic with prefigurative politics. The Old Left may have attended to strategy, but instead of finding means to achieve its ends, it means swallowed up its ends. Both pro-Russian Stalinists and pro-Western Social Democrats substituted organizational imperatives for their proclaimed goals. The New Left's refusal to separate means from ends exhibited an awareness, once central to pragmatism but lost sight of in its bureaucratic version, that means determine ends. New Left politics protected purposes; it did not avoid them.

Nor did the New Left sacrifice political power to remain personally pure. By attending to the personal, the New Left created political power. All social movements connect political issues to personal grievances. By helping the young feel that what mattered to them could also matter in the world, the New Left mobilized a mass constituency. It created public spaces—at the lunch-counter sit-ins, around the police car trapped in Berkeley's Sproul Plaza, in the march on the Pentagon, and in countless local meetings and actions. These were arenas of shared speech, action, and recognition. Those participating in these arenas recovered lost feelings, and thereby transformed selves and institutions as well. As Free Speech Movement leader, Mario Savio (quoted by Breines) explained, "the people are all cut off from one another and what they need is a spark, just one spark to show them that all those people around them, likewise, are quite as lonely as they are, quite as cut off as they, quite as hungry for some kind of community as they are." "Free speech was in some ways a pretext," Savio acknowledged. As the occasion that brought people together, it created a political community. Prefigurative politics, by connecting the personal to the political, was more effective than strategic politics. Perhaps that was what really troubled the opponents of the New Left.

By linking personal feelings to public goals, the New Left was enacting the psychology of R. D. Laing. The movement did not discover Laing until the ecstatic phase of his *Politics of Experience*. But in *The Divided Self* (1960), published the year the New Left began, Laing anticipated the aspirations of the movement. *The Divided Self* depicted the split between a false self-system presented to the world and a self hidden from view. Laing's embodied self healed its internal divisions by becoming present in its speech and action. SNCC chants of "freedom now" spoke not just against racial segregation, but against the constricting social roles that, turning youths into automatons, segregated the performing from the inner self. Freedom was the catchword of the New Left, but that freedom was to be found not so much in individual liberation from restraint as in the recovery of the community.

The intrusion of the personal into the political, with which the old left was most obsessed, was the New Left's attack on the family. Ex-left fathers such as Lewis Feuer charged that New Left politics was a pretext for parricide. It might be retorted that Feuer, rather than the New Left, was reducing politics to personal life. In fact, both Feuer and the movement were calling into question the boundaries that separated the family from society. Feuer spoke for patriarchy. He reduced the New Left to familial rebellion in order to force the young to submit to authority, in the family, in society, and in the state. The New Left, by contrast, extended its critique of domination into the home. The 1950s had idealized the family as at once a haven from the world, a source of personal fulfillment, and a preparation for success in the marketplace. The New Left brought domestic promises of personal fulfillment to bear upon social injustice. It questioned the false promises of private happiness offered by domestic ideology, attacked the family's modes of adjustment to routinized social life, and challenged its repressive internal structure. Theoretical

critiques of the family, which have flourished with the New Left's decline, have sources in the practices of the movement.

New Left sons withheld the fruits of their critique of the family from mothers and daughters. Feminism was, as we shall see, one response to the limitations of the movement. There was also another response, celebrating family roots, that recognized strengths in traditional loyalties that the New Left had denied. But sentimentality about the family is no more realistic than was the New Left's desire for freedom. Burying New Left critical insights, new (maternal) defenses of the family share with Feuer's patriarchalism an acceptance of diminished personal and political possibilities.

Rebellious feelings have sources within the family, since that is where we are born and grow up. Those feelings, confined within the family, generate life-and-death struggles. Healthy politics sublimates personal rebellion; it finds legitimate social targets of aggression and legitimate objects of love. So it was with the New Left. Many in the first New Left generation, particularly northern Jews, came from once left-leaning and then politically quiescent families. Children from such families who engaged in social protest were acting on the dreams of their parents. Their politics mixed reproach with piety. Freeing themselves from the claustrophobia to which Feuer wanted to confine them, New Left youths made alternative families. The "beloved community" for which Randolph Bourne had called emerged in the southern civil rights movement.

Southern black and white students are the founders of the New Left. Together with the Northerners (black and white) who came south to stay, they called SNCC their beloved community. Bourne's phrase, repeated in SNCC, goes back to the Puritan origins of America. Love is the "fruit of the new birth," wrote John Winthrop. It forms the ligaments that bind the mystic, communal body together. SNCC enacted the transforming power of love, both among the members of its community and in its nonviolent impact on the unjust world outside. Students who came from Protestant churches reinvigorated Puritan (and parental) communal ideals. But by extending the regenerate community to America's outcasts, as the original Puritans had not, SNCC radicalized American Protestantism. It rooted itself, by way of Gandhi and Tolstoi, in Thoreau and American abolitionism.

SNCC created political power from transformed personal relations. Breines rightly stresses the new forms of power manifested in New Left communities. But, trapped by the critics whose analysis she is inverting, like them she underplays the historical and social connectedness of the New Left. By recovering the personally repressed, it recovered the historically repressed as well. Contrary to the claims of its critics, the New Left reached outward socially and back in time historically. Although the movement was insufficiently conscious of its American, radical roots, its links to Protestantism, Thoreau and Bourne, to Populism and abolitionism, did not go unnoticed at the time. The New Left surely owed more to its American

sources than (as Breines would have it) to "the thought of Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, Luxemburg, the Frankfurt School and the council communists."

Whatever its sensitivity to its own history, the New Left excavated American history. It uncovered the buried racial history of America, a history to which the 1950s realists had been blind. The war in Vietnam, moreover, pointed the movement to the imperial history of American racial repression. The war promoted historical and imaginative links with American Indians as well as with blacks. Many who attacked New Left ahistoricism were shrinking from the return of a history they had tried to repress.

The New Left made social as well as historical connections; indeed, it was the connections between blacks and whites that made the movement possible. But their alliance with southern blacks has not let white students off the retrospective hook. Why didn't northern students face the problems at home, their successors of the 1980s want to know, instead of escaping to the South? Didn't white students coopt southern black experience to avoid facing issues of their own? Wasn't their attention to the rural South a way of avoiding the more intractable problems at the center of modern American life?

Such questions imagine that social change can be instituted by prearranged plan, as if the priorities given by the mind are the priorities social movements will choose. Southern segregation turned out to be (as few in the 1950s had predicted) the vulnerable area of American society. Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King initiated the action. Breines writes sympathetically about ERAP, the effort to organize the northern poor. But in the absence of stirrings from that constituency, ERAP lacked a base. It was, therefore, not just a failed effort, but a more intrusive one than SNCC as well. Racism, moreover, was a problem faced by whites as well as blacks. White students were beginning to be conscious of the damage racism had done them; for southern whites (perhaps particularly for southern white women) that damage was not an abstraction but a daily experience. Southern blacks and whites wanted to live in their interracial, beloved communities now, to prefigure an interracial future.

SNCC's dream shattered on southern repression, and on the northern institutions (FBI, Democratic Party, federal executive) that tolerated and abetted it. SNCC shattered as well on black demands for racial autonomy and on black discontents with nonviolence; both are inseparable from the obstacles SNCC encountered. Black nationalism replaced SNCC's beloved community with its own prefigurative politics, which grew out of, turned on, and fragmented the early New Left. The northern ghetto was the major arena in which that development took place; a parallel one occurred in the universities.

Students such as Mario Savio, returning from the South, brought the New Left back home. Those retrospectively critical of northern students for going south to solve other people's problems did not welcome the movement to campus, either. The multiversity, as Clark Kerr envisioned it, integrated traditional centers of learning with economic, political, and military power. Multiversities functioned,

Kerr explained, to make students safe for ideas. The New Left challenged the efforts of statist academics to turn universities into training grounds for managerial elites. It is fitting that the student movement began at Kerr's own multiversity, and that he invited the first police on campus to make mass student arrests.

Kerr and his allies attacked Berkeley's Free Speech Movement for politicizing the university. FSM actually offered an alternative set of political relations between school and society than the ones Kerr was instituting—relations to movements and to communities instead of to ruling elites. The FSM, and that is Breines's emphasis, also did something more. It not only reached out to other communities; it also embodied an alternative politics and education, both inside classrooms and in the public forums constituted by the movement itself—around the Sproul Plaza police car, in the occupied building, at mass meetings and informal discussions, and even occasionally in the academic senate.

Thanks partly to the efforts of Kerr and his allies, the university needed to come alive. S. M. Lipset, a member of the Berkeley faculty during the FSM, defended nonviolent protests in the South; there, he agreed, blacks were excluded from power. But the university was democratic, explained Lipset, and its students should confine themselves to established institutions and processes. One did not need to advocate student power to see that Lipset was calling democratic an institution controlled neither by its faculty nor its students. Democracy for Lipset, in the university as in society, did not mean popular power. It rather blessed established, rational procedures, which left power in the hands of elites.

Action and debate in the new public spaces challenged the power of centralized administrators. The FSM also called into question the normal, anesthetized workings of administrative life. By bringing people together, New Left communities recovered the personal point of view, both of those who administered the university and of those who were administered by it. In Mario Savio's famous words (echoing Thoreau and quoted by Breines), "There's a time when the operations of the machine become so odious, make you so sick at heart, that you can't take part, you can't even tacitly take part. And you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon all the operations, and you've got to make it stop."

Savio, by speaking an embodied politics, made himself the representative leader of the early student movement. He did not remain a leader for long, and his disappearance prefigured the problems that would first swell and then burst the New Left—problems of student isolation, of leadership, and of embodiment itself.

Leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society worried about campus isolation. Believing that the poor were the instruments of social change, SDS set up community-organizing projects in several northern cities. The Vietnam War gave the New Left a future, however, on the campus rather than in the city. Perhaps the war, as some on the left believe, temporarily averted an economic crisis that would have mobilized the poor. But black poor did mobilize, in the ghetto riots of the later 1960s. Urban uprisings happened, but they took a different form than that for

which early SDS leaders had hoped. It was a form that both influenced and paralleled the prefigurative politics of the later New Left.

Whatever its impact on the city, the war mobilized unprecedented numbers of college students. Those students needed allies. But worriers about student isolation had not foreseen the possibilities of such mass mobilizations on the campus. The mass student movement, which climaxed in the 1970 Cambodian spring, created a social force of unprecedented magnitude among American youth. SDS suffered from students' political isolation, to be sure. But that problem manifested itself not so much in the smallness of the student movement as in its very success.

The masses who rushed into SDS chapters generally lacked the political background and sophistication of the early members of the SDS. These "prairie dogs," as they were called (coming from the American heartland rather than the coasts), shunned structure and organization. They became the spokesmen, says Breines, for prefigurative politics, and they mobilized a mass movement against the war. Breines is right to insist on the strategic effectiveness of antiwar mass politics. A more tightly structured, ideological organization would neither have mobilized so large a constituency nor have had such a social impact. There are those who believe that mass uprisings extract concessions from ruling elites, and that permanent organizations defuse and conservatize mass protest. That argument, made about the ghetto uprisings, could be applied to the antiwar movement as well. But Breines wants a new society born in the womb of the old; effectiveness in extracting material concessions is not her criterion of value. She defends mass action for what it prefigures, not what it achieves.

Effectiveness and prefiguration in fact complement each other. A movement grows by making a difference not simply for the lives lived inside it but for the lives lived out in the world as well. Movements require results. A movement may retreat for a time into its yellow submarine, as the Berkeley crowd sang on the night of one defeated action, but unless the movement can surface once again, it will turn in on itself or turn outward in displays of irrelevance.

As if to compensate for sundering strategic from prefigurative politics, Breines expands prefiguration to encompass all forms of mass action—the ongoing, personally complex SNCC communities, whose members lived and worked together; the Free Speech Movement that lasted several months on a single campus and periodically reenacted itself over different issues for several years thereafter; mass demonstrations that brought together strangers for brief, intense, epiphanies; and the tightly bonded, violent, elitist Weathermen. It is not enough to defend prefigurative politics; one must attend more than Breines does to what is being prefigured. Breines invokes the council communists (Lenin's infantile leftists), and her slogan runs into the same difficulties as the undifferentiated calls to mass action by the first American Communist Party leader, Louis Fraina.

Todd Gitlin, an early SDS leader, has pointed out that the prairie dogs prefigured something rather different from the early New Left.¹ Instead of belonging to a face-to-face intellectual community, the prairie dogs were part of mass society. More responsive to the media, their antiorganizational politics did not do away with leaders; it rather made the movement vulnerable to celebrities selected by the media. There is nostalgia for the early New Left in Gitlin's comparison, but he knows that nostalgia is not the answer. The communal appeal of the early movement depended on its smallness. The early movement was also naive about power in America and, as we shall see, about the meaning of the personal. A powerful movement for social change had to mobilize prairie dogs as well as coastal sophisticates. At that point, as the original New Left leaders argued, structure, organization, and a leadership chosen by the movement create responsibility rather than avoid it.

Authority was a problem, however. Whereas some early activists came to advocate responsible leadership, those with a charismatic mass appeal often dropped out of the movement. Breines's subtitle, *The Great Refusal*, refers to the New Left's refusal simply to become part of routine politics in America. It might also allude to the refusal of such figures as Mario Savio of FSM and Robert Moses of SNCC to become political saviors. Refusing to be a Moses, the SNCC leader replaced the name of his father with Parris, the maiden name of his mother. Parris and his wife, Donna Richards, were calling attention to the buried importance of women in SNCC. But the oppression of women, instead of providing the basis for an alternative leadership and program, became one more reason to abandon any claim to authority. Parris, like Savio, was repudiating his own power. He was refusing to replace bureaucratic with charismatic authority. Parris and Savio wanted the movement embodied in its activities not in a single leader. They did not want the personal politics of individual grandiosity to replace the beloved community.

But both the problems of leadership and the entrance of masses into the movement indicated that prefigurative politics was not achieved as easily as the early New Left had hoped. The New Left faced, from within and without, severe challenges to its embodied politics. The demise of the movement ultimately owed more to massive intimidation, and to the historic weakness of the American left (Old as well as New) than to its own internal troubles. Political repression from Birmingham to Chicago to Kent State broadened opposition to government policies—to racial segregation and the war in Vietnam. But it also helped split the movement into a violent fringe on the one hand, enraged at and isolated from American life, and a vast, more amorphous, liberal opposition on the other. Pressed from without, the New Left also disintegrated from within. I shall briefly consider three internal problems that called New Left notions of embodiment into question, problems posed by women, by the counterculture, and by the end of ideology.

¹ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

Harris's gesture indicated but failed to resolve the subordinate position of women in the New Left. Women were at the center of SNCC and northern community organizing. But the movement that challenged in practice the exclusion of women from public life relied on its women for nurture and denied them leadership roles. Male New Left leaders ridiculed women's issues both in the movement and in society. Sara Evans has shown how the New Left's promise to reconnect the personal to the political, and the frustration of that promise for women, gave birth to women's liberation.² But as with black power, the personal politics that spoke most deeply to one New Left constituency ended by fragmenting the community.

The counterculture also deepened the meaning of the personal in ways that first strengthened and ultimately undercut New Left politics. Breines's organizational history of SDS ignores the counterculture. But the movement of the latter 1960s cannot be comprehended apart from the movement's culture—the music of Bob Dylan, Janis Joplin, Jimi Hendrix, and The Doors; the dances and posters (in Berkeley and San Francisco) of the Fillmore and Avalon ballrooms; and the drugs. As the New Left shifted from a communal to a mass movement, the counterculture forged bonds of collective identity. Oppositional politics requires a movement culture, a set of shared experiences that go beyond political programs to offer a new experience of life. The counterculture brought New Left ideals down to earth and into the body. To its participants, the counterculture was at once more personal and more communal than the embodied politics of the early New Left. But as embodiment shifted in meaning from Savio's bodies pressing against machines to bodies pressing against each other—to the intensification of bodily experience itself—then embodiment came to signify an ecstatic disintegration. Having rejected charismatic political leadership for an Apollonian community, the New Left succumbed to Dionysiac enthusiasm instead. Nietzsche had written of the birth of tragic forms from the Dionysian spirit of music. But the spirit of music in the 1960s could not finally be contained within political or cultural forms. By the end of the decade the movement was divided between rigid ideology and intense sensation. The tragedies that befell the great spirits of countercultural music, and the divorce of politics from the counterculture, signified that the New Left had come to an end.

The New Left, I have said, began as a protest against ideology. But the problems it encountered suggested that personal witness alone could not replace theoretical reflection. The early New Left was not, as its critics charged, anti-intellectual. The writers it took seriously—Camus, Nietzsche, C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, Norman O. Brown (plus Hannah Arendt on the West Coast, E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, back East), however else they differed, were theorists (or, in Mills's case, exemplars) of personal politics. They all attacked paralyzing ideological systems and encouraged existential action. But the New Left never developed a complex theory of personal politics. When the movement

² Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

entered its counter cultural phase, it sometimes fell into a naive language of liberation; it promised to free an authentic self by throwing off external restraints. That language was contradicted by the practice of the movement, which constituted new selves in collective action. Nevertheless, as the movement tried to confront the relations between internal and external oppression, between instinctual release and human action, between self-expression and communal bonds, it foundered on the formulas of radical therapy. Sophisticated theoretical attention to the meaning of the self endangered the politics of witness and engagement upon which the movement was based. R. D. Laing, both in his empowering early vision and in his ultimate fate, was the movement's psychologist; Michel Foucault has been its owl of Minerva.

The problem of theory proved even more intractable when attention shifted from the self to society. Some in the New Left promoted versions of new working-class theory. Seeing students and white collar workers as the new proletariat, new working-class theory tried to justify student and middle-class activism against the class stereotypes of the Old Left. Breines offers an intelligent, critically sympathetic account of the theory that defended New Left practice. But she does not ask how a prefigurative politics, which speaks to the lived experience of people, can be combined with the sort of theoretical analysis necessary to comprehend American society.

The New Left needed to name, justify, and place itself. New working-class theory gave it a name, but it was a name on Old Left terms, and that opened the way to worse forms of Marxism. The personal politics of the New Left had originally joined mind and body. But the New Left under pressure bifurcated between the mindblowing spontaneity of countercultural politics, on the one hand, and a vulgar Leninist practice and Marxist theory on the other. The New Left had excavated American history, but it could not turn that excavation to self-conscious, theoretical account. Going outside American history in search of foreign models, the ideological branch of the New Left reproduced the mistakes of the old. But if that half of the New Left was too ideological in one sense, the movement was insufficiently ideological in another. New Left politics had begun as the anti-ideological revenge on those who proclaimed the end of ideology in America. But American uncomfortableness with developed, theoretical, historical analysis ultimately defeated the New Left effort to hold politics and the personal together.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I have benefited from conversations with Todd Gitlin, and from his comments on an earlier draft of this essay.