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# The Pastoral Idyll of *democracy*

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*d*emocracy addresses the problems of left politics after the New Left and in the face of the New Right. The journal presents itself as a forum in which democrats and radicals can develop a viable radicalism. While publishing a variety of viewpoints, at the same time *democracy* emphasizes a particular current on the left: that modernization (and modernism), by uprooting people, produces depoliticization and conformity rather than political struggle and personal autonomy. The claim is that political resistance to capitalist modernization only occurs because people hold onto and fight to retain traditional values and local institutions.

Consequently, the strongest voice in *democracy's* forum supports what might be called a populist republicanism by defending community against centralized power, artisanship against factories, households against experts, traditional ethnic and religious ties against cosmopolitanism, and rural closeness to nature against urban artificiality. According to this argument, locating the traditional, communitarian, and local grounds of popular politics and culture promotes "political renewal and radical change" by speaking to those who resist corporate capitalism, state bureaucracy, and consumer culture.

Thus, there are good reasons for the journal's inclination to locate freedom in roots, democracy in the directness of local politics, virtue in the authority of shared values, meaning in the past, and the future in what must be resurrected. As what was once considered irretrievable allegedly becomes viable, radicalism becomes a matter more of recovery than of creation.

This increasingly popular argument for a viable democratic radicalism shifts *democracy's* focus toward the past and traditional values—simpler community and localism. This *pastoral* inclination, however, actually subverts the journal's commitment to democracy, and fails the constituencies for which the journal claims to speak.

The pastoral idea originally derived from the pasture and the feeding, fullness, and peace evoked by the image of the shepherd and his flock. The pastoral vision of the good life always moves us in two directions: from "the city" toward "nature," and from the present toward the past. This pastoral shift situates us between raw nature and civilization, between the distant past and the painful present. It places us in a middle landscape and in the not-too-distant past, in an undivided and organic community subsisting harmoniously with nature.

At the simplest level, the pastoral arises from and speaks to certain persistent tensions that are universal and constitutive: between custom and education; between love and place and desire for new experience; between youth and adulthood; between the familiar and the strange. These tensions are about change. Through often rigid contrasts of country and city or garden and machine, pastoral thought expresses our longing for and memory of rootedness and security, and thus reflects our difficulty with change and our sense of loss.

America existed first as the pastoral idea of the European mind, and early conquest and colonization occurred in the name of fulfilling that idea's promise. (This meant that American pastoralism, unlike the European literary mode, involved the ugly realities of capital accumulation and Indian dispossession, as well as the explicit politics of founding self-governing communities.) Since its inception, America has been conceived as a pastoral project and therefore the primal pastoral contrasts have been the essential form in which Americans have articulated their experience of modernization and politics. The ideal of a static and self-sufficient, undivided and self-governing community has been the American Eden, and thus a way to represent and protest—through the image of the machine or the city—a Fall, an experience of unwelcome change.

In the way it defends nature, community, and citizen virtue against the state and technology, corporate capitalism, and the metropolis, *democracy* continues and updates the basic pastoral contrast. Rather than explicitly speak of country and garden, the journal's jeremiad works from the twin premises of democracy and community to protest past choices and represent the possibility of recovering those values and institutions that would regenerate us.

The pastoral strain in *democracy* uses "community" to affirm the experience of actively sharing and shaping a life, as contrasted to our sense of helplessness in the face of alien, external, and abstract social processes. By keeping alive the rigor of its contrasts, the pastoral voice in *democracy* speaks to our bad conscience about modernization in order to sustain the hope and shape the direction of political action.

In American history, however, the pastoral idealization of nature, community, and citizen virtue was in reality an essential part of the expansion of capitalism and state power. As the writings of "Young America" nationalists and post-Civil War orators illustrate, nineteenth-century territorial expansion and domination of nature were conducted in the name of fulfilling the pastoral romance. The imagery of the garden promoted the domination of the machine. At the turn of the century, machine modernizers such as Woodrow Wilson and Edward Bellamy appropriated the pastoral longing for harmony and certainty to justify the machine world as a garden. And now, the pastoral ideal is used within the machine universe to sell commodity-stuffed suburban gardens to Americans retreating from social complexity and urban disorder.

The major objection to pastoralism, however, is not (only or primarily) its pernicious uses by our enemies, but rather how it shapes our friends' struggle for

democracy. The more troubling and less obvious problem with any use of the pastoral ideal emerges when we regard it as what Raymond Williams calls a "structure of feeling" that shapes perception and action. In this sense, pastoralism always carries us away from complexity, dislocation, doubt, and change, toward simplicity, innocence, solidity, certainty. It moves us from the disorder associated with what are seen as troubling, disruptive, or dangerous (social) realities, to an order associated with happiness and harmony. Orphaned by unwelcome change and then adopted by anxiety, the pastoral impulse seeks to recover the lost inheritance of a true home. Thus is the pastoral ideal, which exists as a "true world," designed to judge and devalue the real one, created.

Appealing to memory—or maybe forever-cheated desire—pastoralism therefore proposes a garden protected from the disorders of nature and history. Along one border of the ideal realm looms the disorderly reality of raw nature, which includes the chaos of human (sexual) desire. Along the garden's other border lies the dangerous reality of "the city," which includes the pride and suffering of humans as historical creatures who, amidst uncertainty and conflict, must create and maintain the conventions through which they live.

The pastoral impulse resists modernization by expressing the ways we value and would conserve what is not made by us, and thereby reflects our sense of deformation and pressure. But the price is denying our own impulses to change and grow, to negate and create. By projecting what they abhor in themselves onto symbols and external institutions, pastoral democrats throughout our history have mobilized popular politics, but only by mystifying conflicts within the self and community that would be better faced on their own terms. The pastoral impulse would uproot from life whatever uproots us, as if none of that were internal to us.

**P**astoralism, as briefly introduced here, characterizes the two traditions that underlie the strongest voice in *democracy's* forum. The first is patrician resentment of modernity, which begins with Edmund Burke and continues through the Frankfurt School. The second is American populism and republicanism. We shall arrive at the second, which is the most obvious in *democracy*, by way of the first.

Like Edmund Burke, *democracy* promotes conservation of the concretely given against the radical solvent of Enlightenment abstraction. Like Henry Adams, *democracy* defends the authority of values against the relativizing chaos unleashed by the dynamo of technology. Like Georg Lukács, *democracy* defends the coherence of the self and the integrity of artistic form against the fragmentation entailed in the division of labor. Despite the many differences between mandarins of the left and right, *democracy* shares with them all the assumption of an intimate connection between the Enlightenment, industrialization, and the creation of a bureaucratically administered, culturally homogeneous mass society.

What is the connection between this tradition of patrician protest and pas-

toralism? These arguments against modernity entail an underlying resentment: like all pastoralists, the patricians read the present only as loss. They presume that a moment of goodness and wholeness has been shattered by history, and thus they read history in Manichean (or melodramatic) terms, as a Fall. In particular, patricians lament the loss of community and meaningful authority, the reality of which allegedly produced strong individuals and political liberty. Consequently, what others call liberation appears in patrician arguments only as deracination and emasculation. Patricians may disagree about whether we are cogs in a machine or the flies of a summer, but few would agree with the Enlightenment that ascriptive society is enslaving. Fewer still would look with favor on the desires for authenticity and equality that have followed industrialization and sparked the major social movements of our time.

Patricians therefore lack an acceptable historical protagonist to carry their values into the future, and search instead for a pastoral retreat by which to express despair or criticism, and locate consolation. Burke's country traditions of the hereditary class system, Adams's medieval community of love, Weber's autonomous medieval city, or Lukács's aesthetic ideals all express a pastoral impulse, however much undercut by the corrosive irony of their self-consciousness. The pastoral quality of these responses to modernity is highlighted by simply evoking the spirits of Brecht and Joyce, Gramsci and Luxembourg. The longing and the irony produce patrician despair: they had rejected all that is modern without the possibility of retrieving the virtues of a past irrevocably lost. They are perhaps our best critics of industrialization, mass culture, and bureaucratized society, but where and with whom do they leave us?

The pastoral strand in *democracy* presumes the patrician critique but also tries to follow Tocqueville in particular, who believed he had found a way out of the nihilism and elitism of patrician despair. Like many aristocrats, he was tempted to make a pastoral retreat from the age of equality, but unlike many, he perceived how his longing mystified the past.

When I survey [this new society] . . . I am tempted to regret that state of society which has ceased to be.

When the world was full of men of great importance and extreme insignificance, very wealthy and very poor, very learned and very ignorant, I turned my attention from the latter to concentrate on the pleasure of contemplating the former.

He said he struggled for a "divine" point of view, however, to see "the advantages and disadvantages" of the old as well as the new worlds. Since the "providential fact" of equality was irreversible, he looked for the possibilities that lay hidden in the loss of all that he had idealized. Then he could say, "a state of equality is less elevated, but it is more just; and in its justice lies its greatness and beauty." Thus, he emphasized:

One must therefore be very careful not to judge the nascent societies on the basis of ideas derived from those which no longer exist. . . . The task is no longer to preserve the particular advantages which inequality of conditions had procured for men, but to secure those new benefits which equality may supply. We should not strive to be like our fathers but should try to attain that form of greatness and of happiness which is proper to ourselves.

Tocqueville overcame the resentful desire to flee the present. He looked instead for the benefits of a democratic age, while also seeking antidotes to its dangers, cultural conformity, and "administrative despotism." Rather than look to transform the household and market relations that generated these dangers, Tocqueville took a more immediately political approach. He looked to local politics as the school of freedom that would bring together and educate selfish, anxious individuals. He could accept his modernity because it created participatory local politics and the ideal of self-governance. At the same time, by enlarging narrow sensibility, participation generated the social bonds and political power to counteract the tendency toward mass society and bureaucracy. Thus, Tocqueville located himself in a history he would otherwise have abhorred and joined with common people he would otherwise have feared and dismissed.<sup>1</sup>

By deriving participatory localism out of his modernity, Tocqueville could theorize himself out of nostalgia and into the problems and possibilities of his present. But historically, localism became the victim, not the gift, of the modernization that brought the evils he feared. Rather than follow his spirit by facing this fact, and then look for the gifts of our modernizing present, many writers in *democracy* follow his theory and retreat to the localism that failed. What worked for Tocqueville as a way to engage his present has become a way to avoid our present. The pastoralism of this inclination in *democracy* is compounded by the fact that the theory and practice of local politics in America has always worked in the deeply pastoral idioms of populism and republicanism.

As articulated in America by Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, republicanism argued that citizen virtue and activism could only be based on individual economic independence and ascetic morality, which in turn could only be sustained through private households engaged in yeoman farming or artisan production. Men grounded in the particularities of the traditional household and small-scale production could become citizens who actively seek and shape the common good of a community that is itself autonomous.

Therefore, republicans always stood against the state, which has been seen as the badge of our fallen innocence, of our lapse from local power and political virtue. Further, republicans always stood against "commerce," which has been

<sup>1</sup> *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 704-705.

seen to rob men of their independence (and therefore virtue) by making them debtors, wage workers, or the slaves of luxury. Finally republicans always stood against the big city, not only because it has been the home of state and commerce, but also because it has raised the specter both of anomic masses and of violently polarized classes.

Activists imbued with these ideas fought the American Revolution and wrote the Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation. The disenchanted republicans who wrote and supported the antidemocratic Constitution employed republican language but abandoned republican premises about localism and virtue. As writers in *democracy* often remind us, by promoting indirect representation, a strong central government, a politics of interest, and weakened states, political economists of empire such as Hamilton and Madison sought to establish an antidemocratic political economy. The true heirs of the democratic "body politic" of republicanism are those, like the anti-Federalists of the 1780s and the Populists of the 1880s, who resisted the modernization and empire entailed by the Constitution's counter-revolution.

Thus, those in the journal who seek democracy in a communitarian localism rightly distinguish themselves from the Constitution's antidemocratic version of republicanism, from elitist politics in republican dress. By focusing on the public life of citizens making choices about matters that directly affect them, democratic localists resurrect republicanism's specifically political sensibility and emphasize its democratic possibilities. As evidenced by their voice in the journal, however, these democrats do not examine how they are still within the republican tradition and why that is a problem. Their writing in *democracy* illustrates how supporters of democracy in America tend to slip into a pastoralism that drags us back into what is problematic in republicanism. There are five republican premises that lead contemporary American democrats in pastoral directions.

First, although most political thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries supported patriarchy in the household, for republicans the specific intention was to create the ascetic virtue they deemed necessary for a stable self capable of moral independence and larger loyalties, and therefore a citizenry capable of collective action and sacrifice. Personal stability and political virtue were threatened when men succumbed to the fleshly temptations of passive dependence or aggrandizing acquisitiveness. These were symbolized as female, and related to the feminine "powers" of state and commerce, which elicited the republican males' fears and memories of longing and desire. So, American revolutionaries, Jacksonian democrats, and abolitionist republicans defended personal autonomy and citizen virtue continually and vigilantly against the institutions they represented in terms of the dangerously tempting, corrupting—always disruptive and usually sexual—power of women. Thus, the household must be patriarchal and culture must be ascetic.

It is not clear whether the dominant voice in *democracy* presumes the household patriarchy and puritan culture that is manifestly breaking down. Some articles are overtly ambivalent about women seeking personal (sexual) freedom or public power outside and against the household designed to control them and what they represent. Meanwhile, the journal speaks editorially to women in terms of the political equality of citizens. Although admirable, this tendency to focus on "citizens" in public works as a pastoral retreat from the lack of democracy in the household, and from the struggle of women to gain power and transform gender relations. Thus the journal does not sufficiently explore gender and household as political issues and rises above the earthly concerns of a major constituency of "political renewal and radical change."<sup>2</sup>

The republican ambivalence about actual women and earthly desire, which is suppressed by the focus on the citizen, returns as a tendency to formulate a citizen politics that splits desire from virtue and the personal from the political. By implying (at the least) that those committed to democracy must choose between the hedonism of selfish individualism and the asceticism of civic virtue, the republican voice in the journal upholds a left puritanism. Understanding and juxtaposing culture and politics in this way deters the journal from addressing feminism's effort to revitalize both by connecting the language of desire to the language of justice.

Second, republican community and politics required individuals who had achieved the economic independence made possible by artisan production or yeoman farming. Small-scale production ensured that no class divisions arose within the community, and no market intruded from without. Consequently, republicans have never been comfortable with the capitalist modernization that enlarged the scale and centralized the power of economic production. They opposed the factory system because it appropriated or destroyed their craft skills and local autonomy, and because it extended the sensual corruptions of "commerce." There was also no political benefit in the factory system because it created workers who, as creatures of bodily desire and dependents of hierarchy, would be incapable of citizenship.

Without actually calling for a return to artisan production, the prevalent argument in the journal against the economic powers that oppress "the community" from without often works as a pastoral retreat from the social realities of class and mass production that shape communities from within. There is an inclination in *democracy* to see individuals as neighbors and citizens united as "the people" against external power, but not also as workers engaged collectively in the production of life, as members of social classes with deeply antagonistic values and

2 While articles by Christopher Lasch (Winter 1981 and Fall 1981) and Jean Elshtain (April 1982) reveal these kinds of ambivalences and problems, a noteworthy exception to the argument here is the article by Mary Ryan and Richard Busacca (Fall 1982).

interests.<sup>3</sup> By splitting work and politics, the strong voice in *democracy* tends to ignore the fact that community is not a solution to an outside problem, but a problem requiring transformation.

Pastoral premises about work not only mystify the reality of community and deprive democrats of an essential constituency, but also create an image of modernization that turns us away from sources of renewal in the modernizing present. Is the factory system simply the graveyard of the revolution, as writers in the journal have often implied? Or could modernization have created a situation in which the collective action of workers and the mass production of public goods could extend political power and equality while enriching the quality of life?

Third, republicans such as Thomas Jefferson presumed that only a racially and socially homogeneous community could nurture active citizen politics. Although women in the household and slaves in the field belied Jefferson's pastoral republic, he directed his polemic against the specter of immigrant workers in the cities threatening the community from without. Being indigestible, this mass of unskilled, racially alien people elicited fears of losing personal autonomy and thus control of the body politic. Women and slaves, absent at first, returned in the racial and sexual symbolism with which republicans imagined and then attacked alien others, strange immigrant masses who would overwhelm the autonomy and virtue—not to mention the political and economic power—of republican males.

Thus, ambivalence about women and workers is connected to the problem of race. In spite of a principled commitment to racial equality, the republican tendency in the journal works as a pastoral retreat from race, which in all its manifestations is a major social fact shaping community life and democratic practice in America. When it focuses on "the people" as citizens, *democracy* abstracts itself from the experience of minorities as real groups with deep grievances against the white communities that surround and control their ghettos. By neglecting the economic and political realities of racial segregation and ghettos, the journal avoids considering the actual meaning of local control, sidesteps the primal stain on localism in America, and thereby avoids a major justification of state intervention into community life.<sup>4</sup>

Like women and workers, racial groups not only embody social realities that elude the grasp of democrats who focus primarily on citizenship and community, but also represent essential values and alternatives with which to renew democratic politics. In this regard particularly, race is not only a question of social justice that requires radical change, but also the necessary beginning for the regeneration of personal identity and national culture. As James Baldwin said in *The Fire Next*

<sup>3</sup> The articles by Staughton Lynd are an important example of a different kind of argument (Summer 1981 and Summer 1983).

<sup>4</sup> The two-part article by Phillip Green on the state is by contrast a crucial example of a point of view that needs more exposure in *democracy* (Spring 1981 and Summer 1981).

*Time*, "whatever white people do not know about negroes reveals precisely and inexorably what they do not know about themselves."

Leaving aside the fact that local republicans were often protecting their actual economic, political, and racial domination of society, behind their defense of "society" against coercive social change involving the state, the fourth premise of republicanism was the sense that power is a blasphemous violation of the relations appropriate among people, and between them and nature.

Although *democracy* sometimes contrasts innocent society and evil state, the domination of society by markets and bureaucracies requires that the journal shift the presumption of democracy and innocence specifically to local community. By defending this community, the journal can claim to conserve the body of the people, the active shaping of a common life, against the deformation and pressure of modernization.

Challenging modernization through this kind of formulation, however, entails an excessively narrow conception of what politics is about and whom it can help. On the one hand, and as we have pointed out, an undifferentiated localism mystifies the character and power structure of real communities by locating outside what in fact also suffuses and divides the community of citizens from within. Consequently, the localist tendency in the journal faces the irony that the movements and values it wishes to affirm actually appear in the struggle *against* the community it idealizes: that active membership and political renewal appear in ways and realms precluded by an exclusive focus on citizen politics.

On the other hand, the focus on localism does not adequately address what divides the people and oppresses community. It is significant that the populist critique of state and market emerged as the bitter fruit of their failed attack on the elites and values of their local communities. It seems unlikely that local politics alone can transform underlying market and household relations, or generate enough power to challenge the overarching and bureaucratic structures that destroy communities. If an unexamined and parochial localism works primarily as a recreational diversion that shies away from either the roots or power of the bureaucratic universe, then the dominant tendency in the journal may betray, rather than save, its ideal of community.

The republican, and typically American, iconoclasm about state power reflects an idolatry of the local community. Granting the limitations of localism would return democrats to the basic dilemma of social change and political power, specifically, how to promote systematic and radical social change while preserving and extending democratic participation. Democrats might then reexamine the consoling certainty that the state *must* be a devil, the large scale power can *only* be antipolitical and undemocratic. We need not embrace Leviathan and endorse Lenin to consider that the republican critique of the bureaucratic state has blinded us to the positive uses of the state (for social justice, racial equality, and civil rights) and

deterred us from exploring how we might transform and use the powers we now demonize.<sup>5</sup>

Republicanism's fifth premise shapes ambivalence about women, workers, and races, and a commitment to personal autonomy and political freedom, into a pastoral, antiurban ideology. In the biblical iconography of republicanism, the metropolis appears as a Babel of collective power that absorbs individuals into its prideful machinery, and as a Whore of Babylon, a feminine power that creates dependent, infantilized men amongst both the rich and the poor. The city is seen as an urban wilderness of anomic crowds and alien powers, intermingling races and open sexuality, unsettling luxury and ominous poverty, impenetrable disorder and fractured social bonds. Consequently, it provokes deep personal fears about control and autonomy, as well as principled concern about equality and political deliberation.

Republicanism does not see, let alone appreciate, the possibilities presented by the city: a world of freer women, and a culture more open to the emancipation of desire, sexual and otherwise; a world of work and classes, and a culture that therefore extolls aggression, productive power, and material gratification; a world of racially diverse and divided communities, and a culture that therefore accepts social tension, otherness, and marginality; a world of change and disorder, and a culture that therefore embraces impermanence and creativity.

Although "the country" has become "the community," *democracy* expresses the classic pastoral attitude toward the city. The strong communitarian impulse in the journal directs the reader toward the known and familiar, the village of neighbors who also act directly as citizens. Beneath such a communitarian desire is a fear of the new and strange, conflict and tension, ill-definition and uncertainty, marginality and deviance, change and disorder in all forms. (In fact, how is the uniformity and conformism of the mass society *democracy* attacks different from that of traditional community?) The journal's notion of community works as a talisman against these fears, which the city embodies.

It is not surprising then, that when *democracy* publishes an issue on the city, it is not clear whether the intention is to bury or praise it. The journal does defend "the city" from corporate domination, but only by assimilating the city to its pastoral ideal of community. In this regard, it is true that a large city includes the roots and attachments of the community of street and neighborhood, and that the city as a whole is a "community" under attack. In these contexts, urban residents often do make pastoral arguments against bulldozers: appropriately, the journal often praises Jane Jacobs, who defended Greenwich "Village."

<sup>5</sup> The populists themselves provide an example of a social movement that transcended the limitations of localism by developing a mass party that aimed at state power, not only to decentralize economic and political power, but to nationalize industry and develop new nation-wide institutions.

The pastoral democrats in the journal can only defend the city, however, by draining it of all that is unique and subversive about it. When facing these realities directly, their pastoral sentiment rules more obviously, in the argument that actual cities fail to meet the criteria of Jeffersonian republicanism. While valid in certain ways, this argument illustrates a smug unwillingness to consider the reverse: how republicanism fails to meet the social needs and political and cultural possibilities embedded in urban life. Thus, in its defense as well as in its critique of the city, the strong voice in the journal operates within a pastoral structure.

As a result, *democracy* does not explore (in order to learn from) specifically urban realities. It also avoids the vast constituency of those who have struggled against the community *democracy* praises, and have chosen instead to live amidst the multiple loyalties and uncertainties of an urban world. Finally, the journal ignores the kinds of renewal required by disorder, flux, and diversity, and embodied by the efforts of the restless and uprooted to form new kinds of bonds. The urban crisis is not only a social question of corporate power, but a cultural question about the form of the good life.

When faced with the master plans, political paternalism, and historical certainties of technocratic progressives, the pastoral radicalism that speaks so clearly in *democracy* may well seem the best way to criticize the present and preserve human values. But it cannot be what it suggests or do what it claims. First, pastoralism tells a limited sort of truth about community and modernization because rigid dichotomies do violence to the complex and contradictory character of social life. Second, pastoralism represents a problematic vision of the good life: the opposition to modernization and the defense of community closes off disorders that are in reality healthy, desirable, and radicalizing. Third, pastoral values create ambivalence about the constituencies for which democrats claim to speak. Thus, it is not clear whether the journal gives voice to actual women, workers, minorities, and youth when it defends "the people," complains of the breakdown of community, and attacks modernization. It is not surprising, then, that the citizen politics by which *democracy* means to evoke active sharing in public life appears disembodied when it is defined in terms of a "community" which is itself abstracted from substantial aspects of life.

While pastoral republicanism and technocratic progressivism simplify by purifying, there is an alternative radicalism that complicates by incorporating. This alternative opposes corporate capitalism, state bureaucracy, and consumer culture, praises popular power and participation, but also explores the difficulties and embraces the possibilities of the great metropolis and those who live there. It locates the political future in the city populists condemn and technocrats bulldoze. It animates politics with the racial and sexual issues republicans fear and progressives suppress. It looks to pariahs outside tradition and the state (such as women and

minorities), and to the repressed underside of tradition (such as the body and sexuality) in order to transform the household, workplace, and community. It proposes a large scale politics that builds on, yet also confronts and enlarges, local institutions and perspectives because it seeks the connections between living in the community as a home and taking responsibility for history (so as to save that home). It grounds the essential perspective of the citizen in the lived, daily reality of his or her membership in classes, races, families, and sexes. It pursues democracy in order to create a community that is both gratifying and just.

Radicals often point out how Reagan borrows the cowboy costume and anticommunist rhetoric from the past of capitalist expansion. The comparable tendency in *democracy*, to refurbish the farmer costume and echo the populist rhetoric from the history of resistance, is a pastoralism no longer appropriate to our condition. We need to read more in *democracy* about the radical project of learning to speak in our own voices.