For nearly three centuries most Western societies have relied upon ideas about "progress," "development," and "modernism" to express what has commonly been seen as the driving force, the defining Geist of their cultures. From roughly the beginning of the eighteenth century progress was a shorthand term for a broad aspiration for social change guided by rational analysis and based, wherever possible, upon scientific knowledge. Change was understood not as mere alteration, but as demonstrable improvement over what had been: "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past," wrote Jefferson, the perfect embodiment of eighteenth-century progressivism.1 To the minds of the early champions of progress, improvement was measurable because they had a remarkably clear conception of what they were against and longed to be liberated from. It was summed up in Voltaire's fantasy of hoping to see the last aristocrat strangled in the entrails of the last priest.

The demand to get out from underneath the suffocating weight of the past was the expression not only of a passionate hatred for oppressive institutions but of a new form of time-consciousness. Priests and aristocrats were, in addition to being social evils, also anachronisms that should be relegated to their proper temporal dimension, "the past." This would allow mankind to institute "the future," a temporal dimension hitherto monopolized by theological discussions of salvation and of "the last days" preceding the inauguration of the Kingdom of God. The idea of progress inspired the notion that a whole society, situated in the here-and-now, should organize its collective life toward realizing the future, the that which-was-not-yet.

From the beginning of its modern history the idea of progress functioned as a political critique directed against the power-wielding institutions of monarchy, aristocracy, and church. Progress quickly became the personal property of

liberalism, even though there was no necessary connection between the two. Nonetheless, progress remained the property of the left, for even when the early nineteenth-century socialists, followed by Marx and Engels, then the anarchists, challenged liberalism, they presented themselves as the true inheritors of the idea of progress. Just as "left" and "progressive" became virtually interchangeable terms, so "conservative" and "antiprogressive" were widely regarded as synonymous.

These historical identities, there is reason to believe, are now in a process of realignment. The left's historic monopoly on change is being successfully challenged and conservatism is emerging as the party of progress. These shifts signal that a profound change is taking place in the meaning of progress.

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative center for policy studies with close ties to the Reagan administration, recently circulated the conclusions of a study that dealt with the prospects of economic growth in the coming decades. The study was framed as an attack upon an earlier prognosis, Global 2000 Report, which had been prepared under the blessing of the Carter administration. This staged confrontation illustrates our thesis. The conservative experts criticized the liberal experts for having embraced certain false data and assumptions that led to pessimistic conclusions about economic growth, world population, food supplies, and levels of nonrenewable resources. They argued the general proposition that life could be expected to improve rather than deteriorate. In effect they were arguing that progress was still written into the nature of modern things and that the limited-growth mentality of the Carter years was a weird aberration. The liberal experts and the ex-president himself were quick to defend the pessimism of their report. However the prophecies of the conservative experts may turn out, they were correct in associating contemporary liberalism with pessimism. Until recently it was liberals who claimed a vision of uninterrupted economic growth and exhorted everyone to rush toward a beckoning future. During the past two decades, however, faith in progress has dimmed as liberals contemplated deteriorating cities, thickening pollution, increased racial tensions, widening social inequalities, the worsening of the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, and the puzzles of stagflation. The mood of disillusionment pervaded yet another liberal report, this one by President Carter's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties. Its membership was an inventory of the liberal consensus, from Daniel Bell to Common Cause, from the NAACP to the Sierra Club. "Today, as we enter the Eighties," the report cautioned, "the world is decidedly different" from the recent and heady past when it was believed "we could simultaneously eradicate poverty, go to the moon, and win a war in Vietnam." The motto of the future was not unqualified abundance but "trade-offs" based on more "realistic expectations." There was much reference to "difficult decisions" and "hard choices," to
the prospect of "a nearly permanent urban underclass," and to the grim fact that the older cities of the Northeast would never recover and so "their 'health' [will have to] be redefined at new, and often lower, levels of population and employment." 2

As liberals became more defensive and hesitant and often broke ranks to join conservatives in dismantling the social programs that had once stood as monuments to liberal ideals of social progress, it was left to a conservative president to declare expansively that America is growing "more healthy and beautiful each year." 3 Two centuries ago the oracle of modern conservatism, Edmund Burke, portrayed the conservative as one who reverenced the ways of the past, looked upon all proposals for reform as initially suspect, and profoundly distrusted theoretical approaches to practical politics. Today it is self-proclaimed conservatives such as Reagan and Thatcher who champion bold initiatives, take pride in innovation, flirt with untested theories, and promise an early return to high levels of economic growth.

Meanwhile, liberals appear stranded in the past, mumbling the litany of New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society, but instead of seeking inspiration for a new and bold vision, they adopt unenthusiastically a negative role: they will restore the social programs that assist the casualties and victims of new-style economic recovery. From being the party of progress, liberals have become the party of consolation, ministering to those who have to be sacrificed if the society is to remain competitive, i.e., progressive.

How is it that conservatives have become the heirs of the ideal of progress? What has progress become such that conservatives appear as its carrier? These questions require that we reexamine the idea of progress and try to identify some of its major transformations. We will want to reconsider, too, some of the ideas and institutions that were early on deemed antiprogressive. They may appear in a different light now that we are in a better position historically to appreciate some of the implications of progress.

The idea of progress was first popularized in the eighteenth century as a major theme in the attack mounted by liberal intellectuals against the established social hierarchies and their conservative ideologies of throne, altar, and inherited status. The most famous of these intellectuals, the French philosophes, along with their counterparts in Britain, Germany, and America, passionately believed that societies could be radically improved if only certain rational practices and truths were installed. If science, education, human rights, and representative and constitutional government were made into the foundations of society, mankind would enter an epoch of plenty, freedom, and peace without parallel. Knowledge, espe-

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cially scientific knowledge, would so expand human powers that the reach of man's dreams would be matched at last by his actual grasp. Condorcet, one of the martyred saints of the Enlightenment, prophesied that

nature has set no limits to the perfection of human faculties; the perfectibility of man is truly indefinite; and the progress of this perfectibility, from now onwards independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast us. 4

Condorcet and the other philosopbes were virtually unanimous about the identity of the major obstacles to setting mankind on a linear road to progress. The hindrances then, as now, were precisely the social practices favored by most conservatives: sharp inequalities of wealth, status, and power; law-and-order governments that dealt harshly with the poor as habitually criminal and with free thinkers as instinctively subversive; the favored position of churches and religious dogmas; education for the few and social discipline for the many in schools and penal institutions; a strong and war-prone state; enforcement of traditional moral and sexual codes; censorship; and instinctive, habitual deference to authority.

All of these practices were charged by the apostles of progress with being oppressive, limiting human potentialities, discouraging experimentation, and having no basis save ignorance, superstition, and class or institutional interests. In criticizing the Old Regime's institutions, Enlightenment thinkers struck also at the religiosity that supported the authorities who presided over the official structure of church, state, and society. The antireligious thrust of the Enlightenment was not confined to the claim that, as Laplace put it, men no longer needed the hypothesis of God in order to explain the universe. The challenge was rather in the revolutionary claims that men were making about their own powers. Science and technology were empowering mankind to renounce a worldly existence that Christianity had taught was irrevocably a vale of tears, a passage full of suffering and pain that would only be redeemed at the end of time when God would make known the meaning of the promise given to Christ and reward those who were elected for salvation. Humanity, it was averred, could now make its own world and so order it as to alleviate, if not eradicate, all of the evils afflicting mankind. Thus humanity could give itself what had hitherto been believed only God could grant, a future of hope and happiness.

At bottom, the confidence in this vision of a man-made future of ever-increasing happiness was founded on the unprecedented powers man was beginning to acquire. The results, demonstrable and quantified, could be readily observed in increasing industrial and agricultural productivity, the rise of wages and in the numbers of employed workers, and the growth of world trade. The first

Industrial Revolution, which took shape toward the end of the eighteenth century, appeared as a triumph made possible by the practical applications of science and hence founded not on wishes or prayers but on fact. So Joseph Priestley, a chemist and liberal reformer, predicted that nature

will be more at our command; men will make their situations in this world more abundantly, more long and comfortable; they will probably prolong their existence in it, and will grow daily more happy... and more able... to communicate happiness to others. Thus whatever was the beginning of this world, the end will be glorious and paradisaical beyond what our imagination can now conceive.5

By associating progress with science, progress appeared as a universal truth rather than an ideology. This helped to mask the appropriation of science by modern capitalism and to leave as unproblematic the extent to which the directions for scientific activity were immanent in science itself or rather were dictated by the changing requirements of capitalism. Concurrently with capitalist exploitation of science, the modern state, which had early recognized the military potentiality of science, began the active promotion of scientific research and technical education. As a result of the combined, and sometimes antagonistic, efforts of industrialists, bankers, politicians, and scientists a breakthrough in the organization of power was achieved. In all previous epochs power had been notoriously in short supply. Rousseau’s formulation was typical of the terms in which power was conceived. Writing about how men generate sufficient power to overcome the obstacles to forming a community, he insisted that

as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome their resistance... . This sum of forces can arise only from the conjuncture of many persons.6

Rousseau was expressing the common experience: men were acquainted with power either as the application of labor to raw materials, or as the mobilization of populations for war or domestic exigencies. From a later vantage point, these ways would seem inefficient and unreliable. So much energy, ingenuity, and resources had to be expended in coercing, cajoling, and enticing perverse beings into obeying authority that very little surplus power remained for effecting the goals of rulers.

The new form of power being assembled suffered from none of these disabilities and had certain positive features that rendered it superior to the older

forms: it seemed to be inexhaustible, readily reproducible, and endlessly improvable. Its secret was shared by both capitalism and science: in the one case it was called “capital accumulation,” in the other “cumulative knowledge.” Both involved the systematic investment of a store of resources (money, knowledge) where it would produce results that would increase the original store (profits, advances in knowledge). Political power seemed puny in contrast. The only way it could be increased was by conquest and, more often than not, the resulting gains were not dramatic. Nowhere was the contrast more striking than in the case where political power was to be handed on, as when a new king succeeded a deceased one. It was rarely, if ever, the case that power was increased in the transmission. The hope was mainly that power could be handed down uninterruptedly, something that was often complicated when the heir happened to be a minor. But scientific knowledge was handed on and increased in the process because, beginning with scientific academies in the seventeenth century, it became part of the meaning of scientific activity that scientists would not simply strike out on their own but “contribute” to increasing a preexisting stock of knowledge.

The contrasts between traditional power and modern power are important because they point to a crucial turning point that marked the transformation of the idea of progress into a process of modernizing. Progress was the vision of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Roughly speaking, it consisted of two principal ideas, liberation from the mass of inherited restraints and their presiding authorities, and the increase of human powers of all kinds: material, personal, political (the idea of a nation in arms), sexual (Diderot and de Sade), and intellectual. The first of these, liberation, was pretty much realized for the middle classes throughout most of Western Europe and North America by the end of the nineteenth century. It was formalized in new constitutions, bills of rights, and representative parliaments. In effect, progress as liberation was achieved and there remained only to mop up the anomalies, such as the denial of full citizenship to workers, women, and racial minorities.

The project of modernizing was, however, of a different order, although this was not fully appreciated at the time. The potential for power represented by science, technology, and capitalism depended on certain conditions being fulfilled, that is, it meant that society would have to accept certain means as necessary if this particular form of power was to be exploited to its fullest. Thus the introduction, use, and improvement of machinery, which was a crucial element in the new form of power, required a view of the worker as adaptable and expendable. It also presupposed a view of the world that was matter-of-fact, “thingified” as Hegel put it. The mysterious and ineffable, which were fundamental modes of experience for religion, had no place. Further, each fresh advance brought new prerequisites: a high-technology economy would require computer literacy and the reverberations would be registered at all levels of education.

Unlike liberation, this second aspect of progress could not, in principle, ever
be fully attained or completed. Each innovation in knowledge/power demanded a new set of conditions for its maximization; each maximization was organized for fertility: it would spawn new powers, new knowledge that called for new conditions. This stage signified that progress had been transformed into a process of modernizing. The dynamical nature of modernization would soon present a marked contrast to the political principles of liberation. The latter would appear "static"—a strong term of disapproval in a modernizing society—and for good reason. Once a society establishes, say, freedom of speech or universal suffrage, there is nothing more to discover. Rather the task is to protect and extend them, to tend them. They become, as it were, established truths, homilies; and these are not the stuff of research at the frontiers of knowledge. Moreover, to the extent the political principles of liberation become deep-rooted, their very rootedness threatens to make them dysfunctional in a modernizing society where, as we have seen, new power is continuously revolutionizing the conditions of its own reproduction. Thus built into the idea of progress-as-modernization is the possibility that the political principles of progress would be viewed as anachronistic and in need of adaptation or elimination. This possibility has now become a reality and it is intimately connected with the new role of conservatism as the party of progress.

To understand the threat of anachronism to the political principles of liberation, as well as the links that have come to connect conservatism and modernization, we need to look more closely at the unique structure of power invented in the name of progress. We shall see that it was profoundly antidemocratic. I shall call that conception of power the New Trinitarianism because it is composed of three elements that resemble those in the creedal formula: capital (the father), state bureaucracy (the son), and science (the holy ghost). Like the old formula, the new one is silent about humanity.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philosophies that had been instrumental in forming the idea of progress, had also done much to popularize the notion of a "social contract" that stipulated power had to be based upon the explicit consent of the members. One of the most striking features common to the elements in the New Trinity, however, is that each depended only minimally, if at all, on the consent of the members of society. The definition of a capitalist, for example, was that he owned certain instruments of production that, according to the principle of private property, entitled him to do virtually what he pleased with them without consulting workers, consumers, or citizens. Similarly the state bureaucracy. Although according to legal forms the bureaucrat was the employee of the state and the "servant" of society, he rapidly became a formidable power-wielder in his own right: he was a decision maker, a rule adjudicator, and a crucial contributor to policy formulation. He was also deliberately insulated from public pressures and buffered by an elected legislature and executive. Although the bureaucrat was supposed to
be controlled by the elected officials, in practice they became more dependent on
the bureaucrat's expertise. The shift from servant to silent partner was marked by
the eventual recognition of bureaucracies as the "permanent" element that pre-
served "continuity" in policies despite the fluctuations of electoral politics. Thus
an important branch of government had been created that, in principle, was not
supposed to be responsive or responsible to the citizenry. This was all the more
ominous since bureaucracies were to play the leading political role in the process of
modernization.

Science, the third element in modern power, became the perfect incarnation of
a conception of power that was to be generated independently of any social contract
or democratic agreement. It was an ideal that had its own theological resonance:
power as immaculately conceived because born of the purest, most disinterested,
and objective form of knowledge ever invented by mankind. For more than two
centuries science was depicted mythically, not as a social institution but as the
miraculous gift of solitary geniuses—a Copernicus, Galileo, or Newton. The myth
of science was crucial to the new form of power for it both etherealized and
sanctified the other elements of power, both of which were reducible to wills-to-power, one of the state, the other of the capitalist. As a social myth science came
to represent expertise grounded upon "truth," the highest form of knowledge in an
age that has mostly forgotten the meaning of "God's omniscience" but remembers
its attribute: knowledge that in no was required validation by ordinary beings.

The common feature in these elements of power is that by nature each
functioned best under conditions of autonomy: the capitalist was most efficient
when least regulated, the bureaucrat most expert when least trammeled by public
opinion or self-serving legislators, and the scientist most productive when allowed
the maximum freedom of research.

The new ground of power being prepared by modern industrial capitalism,
science, and governmental bureaucracies constituted a direct challenge to the polit-
ical ideals espoused by most of the theorists of progress, and pointed to a political
contradiction at the center of their thinking. In America, France, Britain, and
Western Europe it was widely assumed that the struggle for more popular, liberal
systems of government was as authentically progressive as the advancement of
science or industry. What was overlooked at the time was that the movements for
the liberalization and democratization of politics took a diametrically opposed
view of power from the one being developed by the collaboration between
capitalism, science, and state bureaucracies. The battle cry of the revolutionary
movements in seventeenth-century England, colonial America, and eighteenth-
century France had been stated by John Locke: all legitimate power "has been laid
in the Consent of the People." It was reaffirmed in the Preamble to the American
Constitution: "We the People...do ordain and establish this Constitution." We
shall call this the majoritarian formula. Locke had stated its main point: when
individuals have agreed to institute a community, "they have thereby made that
Community one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority.”\(^7\) The underlying notion was that power was generated by and from the people: by their participation, their active involvement in carrying out common tasks, their deliberations over public issues, their contributions of money and labor, and their willingness to risk and sacrifice their lives.

But from the time of the earliest Trinitarians, such as Alexander Hamilton and Saint-Simon, down to the latest neoconservatives and neoliberals such as Samuel Huntington, Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Daniel Moynihan, populist politics has been viewed as fickle, subjective, emotional, and ignorant—the very opposite of scientific and social scientific knowledge. Trinitarianism has thus shaped the original idea of progress into an elitist ideology in which progress depends upon preserving the autonomy of political, corporate, and scientific elites and preventing the masses—whose incompetence has been certified by social science—from intruding their inexpert opinions into the rational decision-making processes of corporations (as in the disputes over public regulations and in representation in corporate decisions), public bureaucracies (as in the efforts to make public utilities commissions publicly responsive), or scientific laboratories (as in the flap over the efforts of elected bodies to regulate aspects of genetic engineering).

The new conception of progress was given its proper name by its advocates: modernization. It represents the mature form of the trinitarian vision. There have been two versions of modernization in America, one adapted to domestic society where the trinitarians have had to contend—mostly successfully—against an indigenous majoritarian tradition composed of liberal, democratic, and populist elements. The other version has been sent abroad in accompaniment to the global expansion of American capitalism and military power. The same tendencies are evident both at home and abroad: the depoliticization of society, especially to discourage mass participation (except at election time) and the formulation of mass demands; and the creation of a technocratic structure whose task is to rationalize the conditions that will preserve order, promote conditions favorable to capitalist enterprise, and strengthen American military power.

There are, of course, differences between the two forms of modernization. In the United States a persistent majoritarian tradition has had to be contained but not repressed. It is not only that the costs of repression would, at this time, be prohibitive, but also counterproductive. Trinitarianism has learned that nothing legitimates power like the spectacle of critical groups participating in debates over policy that, save for minor tactical successes, they rarely win. As a result, the historical function of the left under conditions of advanced modernization has been, as the experience of Jews, blacks, women, and Hispanics testifies, to bring dissidents within the system, or, more accurately, to make them “a part of the process.” Abroad, the

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modernizing process operates in a rawer form, as an export that is either forced upon premodern cultures or is attached as a condition of assistance. The difference is between the Federal Reserve Board and IMF; between defense budgets haggled through Congress and military weapons and advisers deployed covertly; or between spending corporate millions to buy elections at home and spending a few millions of taxpayer dollars to buy them abroad.

If a society conceives of itself as "going forward," then by the same token, it is going to leave behind some of its people and institutions. Progressives have tried to justify these consequences by labeling as "anachronistic" or "archaic" those who have been stranded by the "advances" of civilization. The early champions of progress were clear about which groups or institutions were anachronisms: aristocracy, monarchy, and church. These were "feudal" institutions that could have no place in a future society based on reason, liberty, equality, and representative government. During the French Revolution the lines between liberal revolutionaries and conservative opponents were drawn on the issue of anachronism. The defense of the archaic, from Burke and de Maistre to Maurras, Eliot, and Waugh, has tended to be politically reactionary, culturally elitist, and socially impossible. It has nurtured an antimodernist bias that sees society threatened by the "masses" who have been deracinated from their natural culture of deference and shaped by modern advertising and technology into consumers of a mass culture that is rapidly engulfing education, literature, and the arts.

The American experience of progress struck foreign observers, like Tocqueville, as completely different. America had no feudal past, no Old Regime, no aristocracy or church. When its Revolution came it was swift, less costly, and less radical because there was no system of inherited privilege and power to uproot. By the nineteenth century America would be heralded as an instant utopia, painlessly realized. "America," the historian Hofstadter would drily remark, "was the only country in the world that began with perfection and aspired to progress."

But because America had no feudal past, it did not follow that archaism would never exist. Archaism had to be created before it could be destroyed. This occurred when progress passed into modernization. Modernization took its bearings from the demands of economic competition, first for domestic markets, then in rivalry with other, more "advanced," industrial societies, for world markets. It meant introduction of laborsaving, productivity-enhancing technologies that rendered anachronistic the experience of meaningful work and would eventually create countless persons who would never be employed. Modernization meant an industrial culture designed to produce anachronisms as a constant by-product of the relentless replacement of the recently new by the latest invention or process. The pressures of modernization cancelled any practical meaning to notions of skill or life-rhythms: the one was replaced by "retooling" or simple demotion to the ranks of the unskilled, while the other disappeared into the murderous tempo of the assembly-line. Modernization was equally destructive of the places where people lived, the
relationships of family, friends, and neighbors, and the values they lived by. It was as though a social tabula rasa had to be recreated daily, because the new form of progress exacted certain conditions. Life had to be antitransitional, secular even when it was religious, urban, pragmatic, noncontemplative. These conditions bred an industrial, urban innocence to succeed the romantic, urban innocence about nature (the latter created by Cooper writing about Natty Bumpo from England and by Whitman who heard America singing in Brooklyn). It was the innocence that one could elude the effects of constant change by introducing more change, that human beings could be so completely caught up in experiencing the new that they would be invulnerable to the universal experience of traditional society, the experience of irremediable loss accompanied by renewal, of what the ancient poet Vergil called lacrimae rerum, the tears of things. Who can measure an innocence that remained unshaken despite a bloody civil war? Or who can but marvel at the historical fortuna that has confirmed that innocence by arranging two unprecedented World Wars in which, save for the nearly hidden cemeteries, not a scratch was registered on the land, its cities, or its civilian populace?

Archaism in America was not, however, remotely similar to the reactionary archaism of Europe; it was not about aristocrats, priests, social hierarchy, or the oppressive bureaucracy described so bitingly by Tocqueville. What modernization came to define as archaic were the first halting, limited but genuine attempts at a participatory politics centered around small towns, villages, cities, and state governments. It had many different and changing forms, not all of them theoretically coherent or even attractive: Regulators, Shays's followers, anti-Federalists, urban mechanics, working men's associations, abolitionists, populists, and suffragettes. That much of the ethos of American archaism derived from rural and small-town America; that it was typically religious in a simple, often fundamentalist sense made its aspirations seem quaint in a society that was on the way to becoming the world's greatest example of a progressive, modern society. But if the archaism of the Old Regime had been defined by contrasting the old monarchy with the new representative government; the old established church with religious pluralism and indifference; and the old aristocratic social hierarchy with bourgeois conceptions of political and legal equality, the archaism of America was being defined by inverting the original contrast. In America, participatory politics is dismissed as “populism” and elitism is openly espoused; the efforts of citizens to take control of the political institutions that stand closest to them or to invent new ones are disparaged as “localism” and politics is located around centralized institutions in which the bureaucracy looms as the major power; and protests against assigning huge amounts of the society's material resources to military purposes and following an economic policy that imposes severe suffering solely on the lower classes are waived aside with Old Regime appeals to “reason of state,” only now couched in the language of “national security” and of the objective needs of “the economy.”

Majoritarianism has been condemned as archaic, but this has not prevented the
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president from using archaism to prevent a majority from coalescing. Reagan proved a past master at appealing to archaic virtues, turning them into prejudices and then using the aroused emotions to sow animosity and mistrust among groups who are the natural heirs to "archaic" political traditions of popular revolt and egalitarianism. He has adroitly manipulated conservative religious groups, advocates of prayer in public schools, antiabortion groups, anti-ERA movements, and champions of censorship to discredit and weaken groups that might constitute the basis for resistance to the harsh logic of modernization.

Modernization means the attempt to rationalize an entire society, make it conform to a model designed to impose the most efficient use of available means for the achievement of particular ends, such as reindustrialization, military security, education for international competition, etc. Some groups are natural victims of rationalization: skilled workers and unions; the unskilled youths of black or Hispanic backgrounds; women seeking entry into employment and on equal terms; teachers whose vocation is increasingly viewed as anomalously "labor-intensive"; and young people of all descriptions who find themselves regarded as a resource that must be exposed to intensive technical training so that America can retain its scientific and technological edge. These are some of the groups that can be neutralized politically by mobilizing archaic strata. Archaism thus becomes an instrument to promote progress—and in the process swell the ranks of the archaic. Is a black teenager from an urban ghetto any less archaic in the new world of high technology than the Appalachian coal miner?

For two centuries first progress, then modernization, have stood for steady growth, greater benefits more widely distributed, all classes contributing and receiving more. Now, however, there are increasing signs that the expansive phase of modernization is over. Change will next occur in a context of austerity rather than abundance, of lowered rather than raised expectations. There are numerous causes pointing in that direction: the pressure on scarce resources, the nature of modern technology that allows premodern societies to leap decades and become almost instantly competitive with modernized societies, and, not least, the rising pressures from Third World countries who are not likely to permit a few nations to enjoy extraordinary levels of consumption unto eternity while they contend with worsening conditions of famine, poverty, and miserable living conditions. There is a fair prospect that modernization will have led America and its allies into a state of siege with the rest of the world. It is a prospect for which conservatives have a natural appetite. To make America great again there will have to be sacrifice; agencies of control and surveillance will be needed; a premium will be placed on those few who have the technical skills to keep America competitive; military valor and patriotic submission will be the sum of civic virtues with no nonsense about reverse discrimination, desegregation, and aid to the disadvantaged.
An alternative politics is in bad faith if it pretends that by some substitutions in the Trinitarian formula of power—workers for capitalists, our planners for their bureaucrats, nonscience for their science—the society can be placed on course for the Good Society. The world created by modernization cannot be conjured away. A start can be made on repairing it. But this counsel, too, is guilty of bad faith unless there is a recognition of what is possibly the gravest harm wrought by modernization: it uses the idealism that has been handed down, reworked, and enhanced over the centuries, but it cannot replenish the moral and political resources by which we learn to make our way in the world and care for it. Not from capitalism based on self-interest; not from science which cannot, qua science, tell us why we ought to care for anything, not even science; and not bureaucracy which prides itself on serving any formally legitimate master. We need to recur to examples of associations where human beings have found a basis for cooperating and nurturing power without being tempted to surrender their active roles for some impersonal process that promises relief from involvements and greater efficiency; where intelligence, skill, and inventiveness have a dignified place but are not reified into omniscience which demands power to match its hubris; and where taking care of people and things, rather than using them up, is the basic stance toward the world.

The question is not where to look but what to remember, to recall, and to use as a beginning.